New GAO Report on Interagency Education Programs

A new Government Accountability Office report from November 15, 2010, presents data on 225 programs that attempt to build an interagency culture within the U.S. national security system: http://www.gao.gov/Products/GAO-11-108

The study begins with a not-terribly-urgent paragraph commenting on how the U.S. national security system is, instead of "broken," in need of improvement:

With threats to the U.S. as diverse as terrorism, cyber attacks, drug trafficking, infectious diseases, energy security, and the adverse effects of climate change, the national security landscape has recently evolved in complexity and scope. As we have reported, because no single federal agency has the ability to address these threats alone, agencies must work together in a whole-of-government approach to protect our nation and its interests. Our previous work has shown that there are a number of barriers to agencies’ collaboration in addressing these threats.

Surprisingly, though, GAO makes no recommendations in this report. What would be a sensible recommendation to draw from the report?

How about this? -- Use social psychological research to recognize that if most of the students in an educational program come from one Cabinet department, the program is most likely to be an exercise in evangelization and conformity to that department's organizational culture, not a laboratory in which a truly interagency national security culture can be created.

Programs in which half the participants are from one Cabinet departments and half the participants are from other Cabinet departments are more likely to yield creative interagency solutions; programs in which a large majority of the participants are from one Cabinet department are likely to yield replication of outdated and parochial worldviews.

The GAO report presents data on 13 Joint Professional Military Education programs, all of which are somewhat open to outsiders. Does that make the programs interagency? Well, some are more interagency than others, as a reanalysis of the GAO data below shows. The numerator is the number of DOD employees in the program; the denominator is the total number of participants in the program. (See pp. 23-24 of the GAO report.)

"Token" Interagency (90-100%)

Army Command and Staff General College (1290/1430 = 90.21%)
NDU, Joint and Combined Warfighting School at Joint Forces Staff College (910/1010 = 90.10%)
NDU, Capstone (180/200 = 90.00%)

"Barely" Interagency (80-90%)

Naval War College, College of Naval Command and Staff (280/320 = 87.50%)
Air University, Air Command and Staff College (430/510 = 84.31%)
Army War College (280/340 = 82.35%)
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (160/200 = 80.00%)

"Somewhat" Interagency (70-80%)

Air University, Air War College (190/240 = 79.17%)
NDU, Industrial College of the Armed Forces (250/320 = 78.13%)
Naval War College, College of Naval Warfare (200/260 = 76.92%)
NDU, Joint Advanced Warfighting School at Joint Forces Staff College (30/40 = 75.00%
NDU, National War College (160/220 = 72.73%)

"Partial" Interagency (60-70%)

Marine Corps War College (20/30 = 66.67%)

"Significantly" Interagency (50-60%)

None

"Adequate" Interagency (50% and below)

None

Obviously, the thirteen JPME programs were designed to serve DOD objectives, not a national security objective of creating an effective U.S. national security culture to facilitate interagency collaboration. It will take time to migrate from one objective (serve the needs of a stovepipe) to another objective (create a laboratory environment in which a U.S. national security culture can emerge).

Recommendation: Congress should provide funding to reduce the impediments to and maximize the incentives for non-DOD participation in JPME programs in order to move the average percentage of DOD participants from 85.55% (4380/5120) in FY 2009, to 80% in FY2010, to 75% in FY2011, to 70% in FY2012, to 65% in FY2013, to 60% in FY2014, to 55% in FY2015, to 50% in FY2016.